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Abstract— A novel distributed energy allocation mechanism for 
distribution system operator (DSO) market through a bilevel 
iterative auction is proposed. With the locational marginal price 
known at the substation node, the DSO runs an upper level auction 
with aggregators as intermediate agents competing for energy. 
This DSO level auction takes into account physical grid constraints 
such as line flows, transformer capacities and node voltage limits. 
This auction mechanism is a straightforward implementation of 
projected gradient descent on the social welfare (SW) of all home 
level agents. Aggregators, which serve home level agents - both 
buyers and sellers, implement lower level auctions in parallel, 
through proportional allocation of power, until market 
equilibrium is established.  This is accomplished without asking 
for the agents’ utility functions and generation capacities that are 
considered private information. The overall bilevel auction is 
shown to be globally efficient and weakly budget balanced. 
 Index Terms—distribution system; agents; trading; auction; 
bid; social welfare 
NOMENCLATURE 
𝒩  Set of nodes, excluding root 
𝑁   Cardinality |𝒩| of 𝒩 
𝒜  Set of nodes with aggregators  
𝐴   Cardinality of  𝒜 
𝛿   Maximum allowable per unit (pu) voltage deviation 
𝑃0, 𝑄0 Active, Reactive power from root node in pu 
𝑉0  Voltage at root in pu 
𝑘, 𝑙  The 𝑘th, 𝑙th nodes, 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝒩 
𝒟(𝑘) Set of downstream nodes of 𝑘 (immediate & separated) 
𝓊(𝑘) Index of immediate upstream node of node 𝑘 
𝒰(𝑘) Index of all upstream nodes of 𝑘 to root, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒰(𝑘) 
𝑟𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘 Resistance and reactance of line (𝓊(𝑘), 𝑘) in pu 
𝑝𝑘  Real power injected into 𝑘 in pu, 𝑘 ∉ 𝒜 ⇒ 𝑝𝑘 = 0 
𝑞𝑘  Reactive power injected into 𝑘 in pu, 𝑘 ∉ 𝒜 ⇒ 𝑞𝑘 = 0 
𝑃𝑘  Active power flowing through line (𝓊(𝑘), 𝑘) in pu 
𝑄𝑘  Reactive power flowing through line (𝓊(𝑘), 𝑘) in pu 
Δ𝑉𝑘  Voltage drop through line (𝓊(𝑘), 𝑘) in pu 
𝑉𝑘  Voltage at node 𝑘 in pu 
𝑆?̅?  MVA limit of line going into node 𝑘 ( line 𝑘) in pu 
𝜃𝑘  Fraction of 𝑝𝑘 as 𝑞𝑘 at node 𝑘 when 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑐𝑘   Per unit price of energy of node 𝑘 in (¢/pu), 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝒩𝐵
𝑘   Set of buyers at node 𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝒩𝑆
𝑘   Set of sellers at node 𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜 
𝑁𝑆
𝑘  Cardinality of 𝒩𝑆
𝑘  
𝑁𝐵
𝑘  Cardinality of 𝒩𝐵
𝑘  
𝑖, 𝑗  The 𝑖th buyer and 𝑗th seller 
𝑔𝑗
𝑘  Max generation of 𝑗th seller in pu at node 𝑘 
𝑑𝑖
𝑘  Demand in pu delivered to the 𝑖th buyer at node 𝑘 
𝑠𝑗
𝑘  Supply in pu by to the 𝑗th seller at node 𝑘 
𝑏𝑖
𝑘  Total bid money for demand 𝑑𝑖
𝑘 by the 𝑖th buyer 
𝑢𝑖
𝑘, 𝑣𝑗
𝑘 Utility functions of buyer 𝑖 and seller 𝑗 at node 𝑘 
𝑐0   Price function at root (substation) node in ¢/pu 
Θ𝑘  Social welfare function of aggregator 𝑘 
Ω   Global (DSO level) social welfare function 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE proliferation of renewable energy resources (RES) at the 
distribution level is reshaping the market structure of 
distribution system operators (DSO). The electricity sector has 
devolved from a highly regulated system operated by vertically 
integrated utilities to a relatively decentralized system based 
more fully on market valuation and allocation mechanisms [1]. 
A RES owner with a surplus of energy is anticipated to 
participate in such mechanisms more strategically while 
seeking profit [2], [3]. Specifically, it sells energy with the 
objective of maximizing its payoff, i.e. the sum of the monetary 
gain from supplying an amount of energy and utility it gains 
from retaining any surplus energy that is not traded. In a similar 
manner, the payoff of an energy consumer, i.e. a buyer, is the 
difference between its utility gained from consuming energy 
and the cost of procuring that energy. 
DSOs on the other hand, are expected to leverage the 
available local resources in order to capture additional value by 
optimizing the system for least cost operation while 
maintaining the physical system operation constraints [4]. One 
of the key challenges for efficient energy distribution 
mechanisms is its design to motivate active participation of 
customers [5]. Without their participation, the benefits of smart 
grid is not fully realized [6]. Therefore, suitable mechanisms for 
it to operate effectively within its physical constraints, while 
incentivizing customer participation, are needed.  
The existing literature on the energy grid focuses mostly on 
pricing based on the distribution locational marginal price 
(DLMP) that is defined as the marginal cost of serving the next 
increment of the electrical demand at a distribution node. 
DLMP is typically determined in a centralized fashion by the 
Lagrange multiplier of the distribution node energy balance 
constraint [7]-[12]. It has been shown in [13] that introducing 
price responsive customers causes distribution line congestion. 
In [9], DLMP based pricing is used as the means of dynamic 
pricing tariffs to alleviate distribution system congestion. 
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Similar to [8], [9], the recent work in [10] proposes two 
benchmark pricing methodologies, namely DLMP and  iterative 
DLMP (iDLMP), for a congestion free energy management by 
buildings providing flexible demand. Aggregators in this model 
have contracts with flexible buildings to decide their reserve 
and energy schedule by interacting with the DSO in a cost 
optimal manner in order to avoid any congestion in the 
distribution grid. Standard dual decomposition [14] is used to 
determine iDLMP at the DSO level to alleviate the need for data 
transfer among the DSO and aggregators. This study does not 
simulate market conditions. Its lower level agents, i.e. 
buildings, do not have to place bids in order to obtain energy, 
which is supplied as per contractual obligations with the 
aggregator.  
In this paper, a novel bilevel distribution auction mechanism 
is proposed that converges to a socially optimal solution, while 
maintaining physical grid constraints.  The lower level auction, 
referred to as the aggregator level auction (ALA), is conducted 
by the local aggregators assigned to each distribution node 
among downstream consumers and prosumers.  
The upper level auction, referred to as the DSO level auction 
(DLA), is implemented iteratively by the DSO among 
aggregators competing for the share of energy that the DSO 
receives from the wholesale market. The goal of the DSO’s 
auction is draw a suitable amount of energy from the wholesale 
market and allocate it among competing aggregators in such a 
manner that maximizes the global SW, while maintaining 
physical grid constraints such as voltage, line, and transformer 
limits. 
There are several aspects of the proposed auction mechanism 
that deviate from earlier research. Firstly, consistent with 
economic theory, equilibrium is established by means of a 
market-driven mechanism, where both the volume of energy 
traded as well as the equilibrium price, are determined entirely 
through the ALA bidding process. Thus, determining the 
energy available to each aggregator is shifted to the upper level 
DLA. Therefore, the underlying optimization algorithm is 
parallelized through primal (instead of dual) decomposition.  
Next, the proposed bilevel mechanism is efficient – it 
maximizes the social welfare (SW) of the grid, which is the sum 
total of the utilities of the consumer and prosumer agents. This 
is different from revenue-oriented (or optimal) auctions, which 
try to maximize the revenue accrued by the DSO or aggregators 
[15]-[17]. The underlying optimization formulation in [10] 
which minimizes the total cost of procuring energy, is another 
example of an optimal mechanism. Efficient mechanisms that 
have been proposed so far for the energy grid, are indivisible 
(i.e. discrete) resource auctions, designed for load scheduling 
[18], [19], whereas this research treats energy as a divisible (i.e. 
continuous) resource.   
Information privacy is a significant advantage of the 
proposed mechanism, where the agents reveal neither their 
utility functions nor their individual PV-generated energy to the 
aggregators. This is possible as at market equilibrium, SW is 
automatically maximized separately within each aggregator, 
without the need for any specific optimization algorithm. 
Lastly, asymmetric bidding [3] is another feature of the 
proposed mechanism. Buying agents declare monetary amounts 
to the aggregator and are allocated energy. On the other hand, 
selling agents receive unit costs of energy from the aggregator 
and submit to the latter, the quantity of energy they are willing 
to sell. Although it is possible for an agent to switch roles at any 
stage of the mechanism, in doing so, it would have to change its 
bidding strategy accordingly. For simplicity, in the simulations 
reported here (Section III), it is assumed that agents declare 
their intention to act as buyers or sellers a priori. Bidding 
asymmetry is the means through which proportional fairness 
can be incorporated in a double-sided market-driven auction 
mechanism [3].  
The buying agents are allocated power directly in proportion 
to the monetary bids that they place, whereas the sellers are 
reimbursed monetary amounts that are proportional to the 
energy sold. Although such proportionally fair auctions possess 
certain desirable properties [40], these mechanisms are 
susceptible to price anticipation, where each agent bids in a 
manner to influence the equilibrium market price in its favor. 
Unfortunately, when all agents become price anticipators, the 
overall social welfare decreases. A novel approach to avoid 
price anticipation, through virtual bidding, has been addressed 
in details in [3].  
II. FRAMEWORK 
Consider the radial distribution network in Fig. 1, with 𝑁 
nodes excluding the root. The proposed bilevel auction 
mechanism is implemented in two levels among aggregators 
assigned to primary distribution nodes through DLA, and 
among strategic consumers and prosumers, i.e. agents residing 
on a lateral feeder, by the aggregators through ALA. In ALA, 
each agent’s objective is to maximize its own profit by 
participating in its ALA. Each aggregator’s objective is to 
maximize its agents’ SW, without access to their private utility 
functions and generation capacities, which are shown in Fig. 2 
with dotted lines and boxes. The aggregators make this possible 
by using double-sided proportional allocation [3] and  
participate in DLA by competing with other aggregators in 
order to get their optimal demand/supply share of the real 
power 𝑝𝑘. The DSO’s objective is to implement DLA 
iteratively until convergence, so that maximum global SW is 
attained.  
As shown in Fig. 2, at each iteration of DLA, aggregator 𝑘 
receives real power  𝑝𝑘 , implements ALA and submits its per 
unit price 𝑐𝑘 to trade 𝑝𝑘. The prices  𝑐𝑘 are market equilibrium 
price of multiple parallel ALA algorithms. Upon receiving 
Fig. 1.  Schematic diagram of a unidirectional single branch radial distribution 
system with N nodes excluding the root node. 
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updated 𝑐𝑘 from each aggregator 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜, the DSO executes the 
next iteration of DLA to find the new supply 𝑝𝑘. This procedure 
continues until convergence is reached. From the flow of 
information in Fig. 2, it is clear that the buying and selling 
agents do not reveal their utilities to the aggregator. Similarly, 
the agents’ generations are not disclosed either. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Schematic showing flow of bidding information among agents in the 
bilevel mechanism. 
A. Distribution System Constraints 
The DSO needs to ensure that grid constraints are not violated. 
It is assumed in this research that the distribution system is 
balanced and all quantities can be represented per phase at each 
seller or buyer node. The simplified version of DistFlow 
equations [20], [21] that has been extensively used in literature 
[22]-[24] is adopted here. These equations are as shown below,  
𝑃𝑘 = 𝑝𝑘 + ∑ 𝑝𝑙
𝑙∈𝒟(𝑘)
,                                                    (1) 
𝑄𝑘 = 𝑞𝑘 + ∑ 𝑞𝑙
𝑙∈𝒟(𝑘)
,                                                   (2) 
𝑉𝑘 = 𝑉0 − ∑ 𝛥𝑉𝑙
𝑙∈𝒰(𝑘)
,                                                  (3) 
where Δ𝑉𝑙 =
𝑟𝑙𝑃𝑙+𝑥𝑙𝑄𝑙
𝑉0
. 𝑉0 is the root node’s pu voltage and  Δ𝑉𝑙  
is the voltage drop at line segment entering node 𝑘. 𝒟(𝑘) is the 
set of immediate and separated downstream nodes of 𝑘 and 
𝒰(𝑘) is the set of upstream nodes (including 𝑘) to the root node. 
For instance, in Fig. 3, 𝒟(17) = {18, 19, 20, 21} , 𝒰(27) =
{1,2,27}. The following system architecture matrices are 
defined, 
 [𝐀]𝑘𝑙 = {
1
0
   
𝑘 = aggregator 𝑙     
otherwise,             
                             
[𝐃]𝑘𝑙 = {
1
0
   
𝑙 ∈ 𝒟(𝑘) or k = 𝑙    
otherwise,             
               
[𝐔]𝑘𝑙 = {
1
0
   
𝑙 ∈ 𝒰(k)                 
otherwise.             
  
In the above, 𝐀 is an 𝑁 × 𝐴 matrix and 𝐃, 𝐔 are 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrices 
associated with the spatial topology of the radial distribution 
network. The matrix 𝐀 is the node-aggregator matrix that has 
an entry of unity (‘1’) at every column on the row, i.e. node, 
with which it is associated. The matrices 𝐃 and 𝐔 correspond 
to the descendant and ancestor nodes. Every row (node) of  𝐃 
and 𝐔 has an entry of unity where the corresponding column 
(node) is its descendant or ancestor, and a zero elsewhere. The 
voltage drop in line 𝑘 is Δ𝑉𝑘 = 𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑘 + 𝑥𝑘𝑄𝑘 , so that, 
Δ𝑽 = 𝑉0
−1(𝐫 ∘ 𝑷 + 𝐱 ∘ 𝑸)                                         (4) 
where ∘ is the elementwise (Hadamard) product and Δ𝑽 is the 
𝑁 × 1 vector whose 𝑘th entry is Δ𝑉𝑘. This notation has been 
followed throughout the remainder of this paper – bolded 
variables are vectors of their italicized scalar counterparts, with 
the entry position specified in the latters’ subscripts.  
Using the matrices defined above, (1) – (3) can be written as 
follow, 
𝑷 = 𝐃𝐀𝐩,                                                                      (5) 
𝑸 = 𝐃𝐀𝐪,                                                                      (6) 
𝑽 = 𝑉0𝟏N − 𝐔Δ𝑽.                                                       (7) 
Note that it is assumed that homes are furnished with smart 
meters, and in case of sellers, also inverters [25], [26]. They are 
also capable of communicating their reactive power 
supply/demand to/from the aggregators at the end of each ALA.  
In order to enforce the physical grid constraints, the DSO 
requires the reactive powers 𝑞𝑘 of the aggregators in addition to 
their 𝑝𝑘s, with the latter directly available through the bidding 
process in ALA.  The ratio between 𝑞𝑘 and 𝑝𝑘 is denoted as 𝜃𝑘, 
so that 𝑞𝑘 = 𝜃𝑘𝑝𝑘 . Each aggregator 𝑘 can obtain 𝑞𝑘 as the sum 
of the reactive power requirement obtained directly from its 
agents in 𝒩𝐵
𝑘 ∪ 𝒩𝑆
𝑘 at the termination of each round of ALA. 
Alternately, 𝑞𝑘 can be estimated from historical data. In this 
research, it is assumed that the aggregator has access to the 
numerical value of 𝜃𝑘, that is communicated to the DSO along 
with 𝑐𝑘. With 𝛉 = [𝜃𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜   and 𝐪 = 𝛉 ∘ 𝐩 as elementwise 
product of 𝛉 and 𝐩, using (4), the expressions in (5) – (7) can 
be rewritten as, 
𝑷 = 𝐃𝐀𝐩,                                                             (8) 
𝑸 = 𝐃𝐀(𝛉 ∘ 𝐩),                                                  (9) 
               𝑽 = 𝑉0𝟏N −
1
𝑉0
𝐔(𝐫 ∘ 𝐃𝐀𝐩 + 𝐱 ∘ 𝐃𝐀(𝛉 ∘ 𝐩)). (10) 
In the simplified DistFlow equations above, the real/reactive 
branch flows and node voltages are entirely functions of real 
power injection 𝐩, substation per unit voltage 𝑉0 and 
distribution grid topology. The DSO can implement DLA to 
determine 𝐩, using (8) – (10) to set up grid constraints, which 
are explained below. 
A.1 Transformer Capacity: Since the distribution 
transformer(s) at the substation node has limited capacity, the 
total apparent power that the DSO can draw from the wholesale 
market is bounded as, 
𝐩T𝐙𝟎𝐩 ≤ 𝑆0
2.                                                       (11) 
Here, the matrix 𝐙𝟎 is given by, 
 
𝐙𝟎 = 𝟏𝐴𝟏𝐴
T + 𝛉𝛉T.                                          (12) 
A.2 Line Limits: The total apparent power at line 𝑘 cannot 
exceed its MVA limit 𝑆?̅? so that 𝑃𝑘
2 + 𝑄𝑘
2 ≤ 𝑆?̅?
2. Defining the 
matrix 𝐄𝑘 as a square matrix with the only non-zero entry of 
unity appearing at the 𝑘th row and the 𝑘th column, it is seen that, 
𝑝𝑘 𝑐𝑘 
𝑐𝑘 
𝑠𝑗 𝑏𝑖 
𝑑𝑖 
Distribution 
System Operator
Seller
Agent j
Social Welfare
Allocation
Bid Supply
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Buyer 
Agent iBuyer 
Agent 1
Seller 
Agent 1
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𝐏T𝐄𝑘𝐏 + 𝐐
T𝐄𝑘𝐐 ≤ 𝑆?̅?
2. 
Whence, using (8) and (9), the following line limit constraint is 
obtained, 
 𝐩T𝐙𝑘𝐩 ≤ 𝑆?̅?
2, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒩.                             (13) 
Each matrix 𝐙𝑘 above is given by, 
           𝐙𝑘 = 𝐀
T𝐃T𝐄𝑘𝐃𝐀 +  𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝛉𝐀
T𝐃T𝐄𝑘𝐃𝐀𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝛉.  (14) 
A.3 Node Voltage Limits: The voltage at node 𝑘 is given by 
(10), and expressed solely in terms of 𝐩 and other grid 
parameters. The total voltage deviation at node 𝑘 must not 
exceed a numerical value of 𝛿 (typically 0.05), yielding the 
following constraint, 
𝟏𝑁 − 𝛅 ≤ 𝑽 ≤ 𝟏𝑁 + 𝛅.                                     (15) 
Whence using (10) in (15), and upon further simplification the 
following bounds on the power vector 𝐩 are obtained, 
𝐥 ≤ 𝐌𝐩 ≤ 𝐥.                                                         (16) 
In the above expression, the lower and upper bounds are, 
𝐥 = (V0 − 1)𝟏𝑁 − 𝛅, 𝐥 = (V0 − 1)𝟏𝑁 + 𝛅. 
The matrix 𝐌 that shows the sensitivity of voltage deviation to 
power injection 𝐩 is equal to, 
𝐌 = 𝐌𝑃 + 𝐌𝑄𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝛉,                                       (17) 
where, 𝐌𝑃 = 𝑉0
−1𝐔𝐫 ∘ 𝐃𝐀, 𝐌𝑄 = 𝑉0
−1𝐔𝐱 ∘ 𝐃𝐀. 
A.4 Budget Balance: As in [27], [13], [10], the market price at 
the substation node is coupled with the demand drawn by the 
grid from the wholesale market and is modeled as,  
𝑐0 = 𝑐0
𝑏 + 𝛽0 ∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝑘
.                                          (18) 
Here, c0
b is the base demand price and β0 is the elasticity 
coefficient that can be obtained using statistics of historical data 
of locational marginal price as explained in [27]. The subscript 
‘0’ appears in all variables to indicate association with the root 
node. Note that to model c0, the DSO can add a reasonable fixed 
amount to c0
b to account for any grid usage tariff.  The 
underlying mechanism remains weakly budget balanced despite 
this increment. In other words, 𝐜T𝐩 − 𝑐0𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 ≥ 0. Replacing c0 
from (18) yields the following DSO budget balance constraint, 
𝑐0
𝑏𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 − 𝐜T𝐩 + 𝛽0𝐩
T𝟏𝐴𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 ≤ 0.                        (19) 
B.  DSO Level Auction 
B.1 Social Welfare Problem: The feasible set 𝔊 consists of all 
power vectors 𝐩 that meet constraints in (11), (13), (16) and 
(19) pertaining to substation transformer MVA limit, lines 
MVA limit, nodes voltage limits, and DSO budget balance, i.e.  
𝔊 = {𝐩|
∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒩 ∪ {0}: 𝐩T𝐙𝑘𝐩 ≤ 𝑆?̅?
2,
∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒩: 𝐥 ≤ 𝐌𝐩 ≤ 𝐥,
𝑐0
𝑏𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 − 𝐜T𝐩 + 𝛽0𝐩
T𝟏𝐴𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 ≤ 0
}.   (20) 
The goal of DSO is to solve the SW problem as stated below. 
Maximize w.r.t. [𝐝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , [𝐬
𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , 𝐩: 
    Ω([𝐝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , [𝐬
𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , 𝐩) = ∑ Θ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘 , 𝐬𝑘, 𝐩)
𝑘∈𝒜
. (21) 
Subject to: 
    𝐩 ∈ 𝔊, 
𝐩 = [𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘]
𝑘∈𝒜
,                             (22) 
𝐬𝑘 ≤ 𝐠𝑘.                                                                (23) 
In this constrained optimization problem formulation, Ω is the 
global SW, obtained by aggregating that of each aggregator Θ𝑘. 
The equality constraint in (22) restricts the quantity pk allocated 
to each aggregator k as the difference between the total energy 
demanded by the buyers (𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘) and that supplied by the 
sellers (𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘). The inequality constraint in (23) is present so 
that the power supplied 𝑠𝑗
𝑘, by any seller 𝑗 stays below its 
generation 𝑔𝑗
𝑘 . 
Each aggregator level SW Θ𝑘 in (21) is given by, 
Θ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘 , 𝐬𝑘|p𝑘) = 𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐮𝑘 + 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐯𝑘 ,                 (24) 
where 𝐮𝑘and 𝐯𝑘 are the hidden utility functions of buyers and 
sellers in aggregator 𝑘.  
Under the assumption that the utility functions 𝒖𝑘and 𝒗𝑘 are 
concave, the SW optimization problem is convex. Note that in 
the DSO SW problem, 𝐝𝑘 and 𝐬𝑘 are local variable vectors 
pertaining to aggregator 𝑘’s buyers and sellers demand and 
supply whereas 𝐩 is the global variable vector of injections to 
all aggregators. Due to lack of access to the utility functions 
𝑢𝑘, 𝑣𝑘, and for scalability [28], [29], the DSO implements a 
distributed algorithm by decomposing its original problem into 
a master and multiple sub-problems that are solved in a 
distributed fashion. The master problem is solved by DLA and 
the sub-problems are solved by ALAs locally. 
B.2 Distributed Implementation: At the lower level, each 
aggregator 𝑘, implements the following sub-problem in parallel 
by means of ALA: 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝐝𝑘 , 𝐬𝑘 ∶  Θ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘, 𝐬𝑘 , 𝐩). 
Subject to (22) and (23). 
At the upper level, each iteration of DLA realizes a projected 
gradient descent step of the decomposed SW problem with 𝐩 as 
the global variable. The DSO sends to each aggregator 𝑘 the 
energy 𝑝𝑘 and receives the gradient direction 𝛌 = ∇𝐩Ω from it. 
It will be shown in Proposition 7 that 𝛌 = 𝐜 the vector of prices 
towards which ALA converges. Next, the vector 𝐩 is 
incremented by an amount 𝜖𝛌 to 𝐩′′, where 𝜖 is the gradient step 
size. The vector 𝐩′′ is then projected onto the feasible region 𝔊, 
after the constraint parameters are updated according to (14) 
and (17). Parameter updates are required because the reactive 
power changes according to the numerical value of the 
projection 𝐩′, which in turn causes the fraction 𝛉 to change.  
The DLA algorithm terminates when any aggregator 𝑘 
returns a flag 𝒶𝑘 = 𝐹 defined in the following, indicating that 
the constraints in (22) and (23) were not satisfied, 
𝒶k = {
𝑇 if 𝑝𝑘 = 𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘 ,
𝐹 if 𝑝𝑘 ≠ 𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘.
                 (25) 
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Algorithm DLA: 
𝐩 ← initial 
 Repeat: 
  Send to aggregators 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜: 𝑝𝑘 
  Receive from aggregators 𝑘 ∈ 𝒜: 𝜆𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘 , 𝒶𝑘 
  If ⋀ 𝒶𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑇 then exit loop 
𝐩′′ ← 𝐩 + 𝜖𝛌 
  Compute constraint parameters: 𝛉, 𝐌, 𝐙𝑘 
𝐩′ ← argmin
𝐩∈𝔊
‖𝐩 − 𝐩′′‖ 
 Until convergence 
 Output: 𝐩, 𝐜, [𝐝𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , [𝐬
𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜  
C. Aggregator Level Auction 
C.1 Virtual Bidding: Price anticipation is an undesirable effect 
that occurs in proportional auctions with relatively few bidders 
[3], [30]. In such scenarios, the bidders are aware of the 
sensitivity of the equilibrium price, i.e. that  
∂𝑐𝑘
∂𝑏𝑖
𝑘 ≠ 0 for a buyer, 
and 
∂𝑐𝑘
∂𝑠𝑗
𝑘 ≠ 0 for a seller. As the bidders place bids to maximize 
their individual payoffs, price anticipation leads to inefficiency. 
In [3], virtual bidding is shown to approach price-taking 
conditions for isolated microgrids by lowering the market 
powers of the bidders. Virtual bidding involves the presence of 
a virtual agent, which acts as both a seller and a buyer. Unlike 
other agents, the virtual bidder is merely an algorithmic entity 
that is incorporated within the aggregator, ergo has access to 𝐛𝑘 
and 𝐬𝑘. By incorporating the virtual bidder, whose buying and 
selling bids can be as large as possible, the aggregator enables 
the price approach that of a market with potentially infinite 
number of agents. The larger the number of bidder agents, the 
less the effect of price anticipation [3]. Before addressing the 
implementation of ALA, the following propositions are 
established. 
Proposition–1: Due to virtual bidding, ALA can be arbitrarily 
close to price taking mechanism. In other words, the following 
expressions hold, 
𝑐𝑘 =
𝟏
NB
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘
𝑝𝑘 + 𝟏𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
,                                              (26) 
𝜕𝑐𝑘
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘 = 0,
𝜕𝑐𝑘
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑘 = 0.                                              (27) 
Proof: The virtual bidder bids a large amount of energy 𝑠0, 
which it buys for a total amount 𝑐𝑘
0𝑠0. Here 𝑐𝑘
0 =
𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘
𝑝𝑘+𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
 is the 
desired price under price taking. The actual price, 𝑐𝑘 =
𝑐𝑘
0𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘
𝑝𝑘+𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
, is computed by the aggregator. It can be readily 
established that lim
𝑠0→∞
𝑐𝑘 = lim
𝑠0→∞
𝑐𝑘
0𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘
𝑝𝑘+𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
, justifying (26). 
Likewise lim
𝑠0→∞
∂𝑐𝑘
∂𝑏𝑖
𝑘 = lim
𝑠0→∞
1
𝑝𝑘+𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
(1 +
∂𝑐𝑘
0
∂𝑏𝑖
𝑘) = 0 and 
lim
𝑠0→∞
∂𝑐𝑘
∂𝑠𝑗
𝑘 = lim
𝑠0→∞
1
𝑝𝑘+𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
(1 −
𝑐𝑘
0𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘−𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
𝑝𝑘+𝑠0+𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
)
∂𝑐𝑘
0
∂𝑠𝑗
𝑘 = 0, 
so that (27) is valid in the limiting scenario. In other words, the 
presence of the virtual bidder that place very high bids allows 
the auction to behave as one with a large number of agents. 
Under these circumstances, the participating agents bid as price 
takers. 
Proposition-2: ALA is strongly budget and energy balanced.  
Proof: It follows from virtual bidding (26) that 𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑘 +
𝑐𝑘𝟏𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘 = 𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘. The RHS is the total monetary amount that 
the aggregator receives from the buyers. The LHS is the sum of 
the payment that the aggregator makes to the DSO and the 
reimbursement amount given to the sellers. This establishes 
strong budget balance. Energy balance is established under the 
proportional allocation auction paradigm [31], where the 
energy to each buyer to be proportional to its bid, i.e. 𝐝𝑘 =
1
𝑐𝑘
𝐛𝑘 . Energy balance immediately follows from (26). Note that 
this satisfies the constraint in in (22). 
C.2 Distributed Implementation: ALA receives 𝑝𝑘 from the 
DSO, and initializes the price 𝑐𝑘 (see Fig. 2). In each step, it 
sends 𝑐𝑘 to the sellers and receives 𝐬
𝑘. Using proportional 
allocation, it determines 𝐝𝑘 which is communicated to the 
buyers. The buyers return their bids 𝐛𝑘. The price 𝑐𝑘 is 
determined as a two-step procedure using virtual bidding.  
Algorithm ALA(𝑘):  
Receive from DSO: 𝑝𝑘 
Initialize: 𝑐𝑘 
Repeat: 
Send to sellers: 𝑐𝑘 
Receive from sellers: 𝐬𝑘 
𝐝𝑘 ←
1
𝑐𝑘
𝐛𝑘 
Send to buyers: 𝐝𝑘 
Receive from buyers: 𝐛𝑘 
𝑐𝑘
0 ←
𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘
𝑝𝑘 + 𝟏𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
 
𝑐𝑘 ←
𝑐𝑘
0𝑠0 + 𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐛𝑘
𝑝𝑘 + 𝑠0 + 𝟏𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘
 
Until equilibrium 
Send to DSO: 𝑐𝑘 
D. Equilibrium Analysis 
D.1 Bidding Strategies: Buyers and sellers’ bidding strategies 
are established by means of the following propositions. 
Proposition-3: The bid 𝑏𝑖
𝑘 placed by each buyer 𝑖 is such that 
its marginal utility equals its per unit price,  
𝜕𝑢𝑖
𝑘
𝜕𝑑𝑖
𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘 .                                                             (28) 
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Proof: The buyer’s payoff 𝑢𝑖
𝑘(𝑑𝑖
𝑘) − 𝑏𝑖
𝑘, is maximized when its 
derivative is zero, i.e.  
𝜕
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘 𝑢𝑖
𝑘(𝑑𝑖
𝑘) − 1 =
𝜕𝑢𝑖
𝑘
𝜕𝑑𝑖
𝑘
1
𝑐𝑘
(1 −
1
𝑐𝑘
𝜕𝑐𝑘
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘) −
1 = 0. Under virtual bidding, (27) holds so that (28) is satisfied. 
Proposition-4: The bid 𝑠𝑗
𝑘 placed by each seller 𝑗 is such that if 
the seller does not bid its entire generation (𝑠𝑗
𝑘 < 𝑔𝑗
𝑘), its 
marginal utility, with 𝛾𝑗
𝑘 ≥ 0 being a positive scalar quantity, 
equals its per unit price, 
𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝑘
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑘 = 𝛾𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑐𝑘 ,         
{
𝛾𝑗
𝑘 = 0, 𝑠𝑗
𝑘 < 𝑔𝑗
𝑘 ,
𝛾𝑗
𝑘 > 0, 𝑠𝑗
𝑘 = 𝑔𝑗
𝑘 .
                                     (29) 
Proof: In fact, 𝛾𝑗
𝑘 is a dual variable as shall be seen here. The 
seller’s payoff 𝑣𝑗
𝑘(𝑔𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑠𝑗
𝑘) + 𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑗
𝑘 is maximized under the 
constraint 𝑠𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 𝑔𝑗
𝑘. The Lagrangian for this problem 
is 𝐿𝑗(𝑠𝑗
𝑘) = 𝑣𝑗
𝑘(𝑔𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑠𝑗
𝑘) + 𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑗
𝑘 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑘(𝑠𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑔𝑗
𝑘). At 
stationarity,  
𝜕
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑘 𝐿𝑗 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑘 𝑣𝑗
𝑘(𝑔𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑠𝑗
𝑘) + 𝑐𝑘 + 𝑠𝑗
𝑘 𝜕𝑐𝑘
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑘 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑘 =
0. Under virtual bidding, (27) holds so that (29) is satisfied. 
D.2 Aggregator Equilibrium: During each iteration of DLA, an 
aggregator establishes equilibrium conditions to return price 𝑐𝑘. 
Proposition-5: The equilibrium of the aggregator 𝑘’s auction 
maximizes the social welfare Θ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘, 𝐬𝑘 , 𝐩) as defined in Eqn. 
(24) with respect to 𝐝𝑘 , 𝐬𝑘 under the energy balance constraint, 
𝑝𝑘 = 𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘 and with no seller selling more energy 
than its generated capacity, 𝐬𝑘 ≤ 𝐠𝑘. 
Proof: The statement above defines a constrained optimization 
problem with the following Lagrangian ℒ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘, 𝐬𝑘),  
ℒ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘 , 𝐬𝑘) = Θ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘, 𝐬𝑘) − 𝛄𝑘
T(𝐬𝑘 − 𝐠𝑘)     
                   −λ𝑘 (𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘 − 𝑝𝑘) . (30)
 
The constrained optimum satisfies ALA’s energy balance 
condition. Stationarity at the optimum implies that ∇𝐝𝑘ℒ𝑘 = 0 
and ∇𝐬𝑘ℒ𝑘 = 0. From (24), it is that ∇𝐝𝑘𝐮
𝑘 = 𝜆𝑘𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘  
and ∇𝐬𝑘𝐯
𝑘 = 𝛄𝑘 − 𝜆𝑘𝟏𝑁𝑆
𝑘, so that the optimum of Θ𝑘 coincides 
with the auction equilibrium when 𝜆𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘 in (28) and (29) and 
with 𝛄𝑘 being the vector of entries 𝛾𝑗
𝑘 in (29). 
Proposition-6: The price vector 𝐜 returned by ALA is also the 
gradient of the overall SW function given by (21), i.e. 
∇𝐩Ω([𝐝
𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , [𝐬
𝑘]𝑘∈𝒜 , 𝐩) = 𝐜.                       (31) 
Proof: From (28) and (29), it is seen that 𝜆𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘. It follows 
that 
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑘
Θ𝑘(𝐝
𝑘, 𝐬𝑘) =  𝑐𝑘. The expression in (31) directly 
follows from (21). 
D.3 Global Equilibrium:  
Proposition–7: Under certain assumptions, the bilevel auction 
mechanism converges to the unique global maximum of the 
social welfare. 
Proof:  The matrix 𝐙0 in (12) can be recognized to be symmetric 
positive semidefinite (SPSD). The matrix 𝐄𝑘 in (14) is also an 
SPSD matrix with a single non-zero eigenvalue of unity. The 
first and second terms in the expression for 𝐙𝑘 in (14) being 
similar to 𝐄𝑘 under the transform matrices 𝐃𝐀 and 𝐃𝐀𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝛉, 
have the same eigenvalues and are therefore SPSD. Each matrix 
𝐙𝑘  (𝑘 ∈ 𝒩) being the sum of two such SPSD matrices is also 
SPSD. Hence, suppose 𝐜 were constant, the region 𝔊 would be 
convex in 𝐩 since it would contain only convex quadratic and 
linear inequality constraints.  
However, 𝐜 is dependent on 𝐩 as the equilibrium price 𝑐𝑘 of 
any aggregator 𝑘 is determined by the power 𝑝𝑘 and the market 
mechanism. From (21) and (31), 
𝜕Θ𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑘
= 𝑐𝑘 whereas from (28) 
and (29), 
𝜕𝑢𝑖
𝑘
𝜕𝑑𝑖
𝑘 = −
𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝑘
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘. Hence 
𝜕𝑢𝑖
𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑘
=
𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑘
= 𝑐𝑘. We assume 
that the utilities are strictly concave and increasing, i.e. that the 
marginal utility of the energy consumed is always positive no 
matter how small. Under these circumstances, neglecting cubic 
and higher order terms, the SW can be approximated as,  Θ𝑘 =
𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑘 + ℎ𝑘𝑝𝑘
2, where ℎ𝑘 < 0. In fact, some recent research have 
modeled utilities as quadratic functions [32], [33], [18].Thus 
Ω ≈ 𝐜T𝐩 + 𝐩T𝐇𝐩, where 𝐇 is a negative definite diagonal 
matrix thereby rendering Ω as strictly concave in 𝐩. As the 
feasible region is strictly convex, termination of DLA due to a 
constraint violation can take place only when the constrained 
optimum has been reached with the violating constraint being 
active. DLA is a straightforward implementation of projected 
gradient ascent of the SW problem, whose convergence to the 
global minimum has been well studied [29], [34], [35]. 
Proposition–8: The bilevel auction is weakly budget balanced. 
Proof: From Proposition-2, ALA is strongly budget balanced, 
so that 𝑐𝑘𝟏𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝑐𝑘𝟏𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘 = 𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑘 . (19) explicitly imposes 
the weak budget balance constraint at the DSO level so that 
𝐜T [𝟏
𝑁𝐵
𝑘
T 𝐝𝑘 − 𝟏
𝑁𝑆
𝑘
T 𝐬𝑘]
𝑘∈𝒜
≥  𝑐0
b𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 + 𝛽0𝐩
T𝟏𝐴𝟏𝐴
T𝐩. The left 
side of this inequality is the total revenue collected from the 
sum total of all agents and the right side is the total payment 
made to the wholesale market. Since the latter can never exceed 
the money collected, the bilevel auction is weakly budget 
balanced. 
III. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Simulation results corroborates the theory presented in section 
II. A modified IEEE 37 node system as shown in Fig. 3 has been 
used to simulate the proposed bilevel energy allocation 
mechanism. A total of 483 agents, 303 buyers and 180 sellers, 
were generated and assigned to different nodes with 
aggregators. As summarized in Table I, seventeen aggregators 
(labeled A𝑘) with different numbers of buyer and seller agents 
each with their own sets of parameters were created and 
assigned to nodes that have load.  Fig. 3. shows a schematic of 
the IEEE 37 node system, where the nodes with aggregators are 
enclosed within shaded circles.  
Due to their wide use in the literature for quantifying user 
satisfaction with diminishing returns, the utility functions of the 
agents were assumed to follow concave logarithmic curves 
[36]-[38] according to the equations 𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖 log(𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 1) 
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and 𝑣𝑗(𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗) = 𝑥𝑗 log(𝑦𝑗(𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗) + 1).The 
quantities 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗  and 𝑦𝑗 in these equations were generated 
randomly, separately for each agent. They were adjusted so that 
agents’ marginal utilities are scaled to reasonable per unit 
prices. The generation 𝑔𝑗 for sellers were also drawn at random, 
uniformly in the interval [0.1, 0.5] pu based on a system base 
value of 100 kVA.  
 
TABLE I 
 AGGREGATOR ASSIGNMENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE NUMBER 
OF BUYER AND SELLER AGENTS TO NODES 
𝐀𝒌 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Node 1 8 12 13 17 18 22 23 25 26 27 29 30 31 33 35 36 
𝑵𝑩
𝒌  14 11 25 27 20 8  21 27 22 21 5  13 7  19 10 26 27 
𝑵𝑺
𝒌 13 7  5  21 22 10 15 6  4  22 3  9  4  19 5  6  9  
 
Four different scenarios were created to examine the impact 
that the price and substation node’s capacity have on DLA’s 
allocation of energy to each aggregator and ALA allocations to 
local buyer and seller agents along with the resulting global 
SW. These four scenarios were created with differing wholesale 
market price and substation transformer capacity parameters, 
according to (18) and (11) as follow.  
I)   c0
b = 800¢/pu (high), β0 = 40¢/pu
2(elastic), S0 = 25 pu 
II)  c0
b = 200¢/pu (low),  β0 = 30¢/pu
2(elastic), S0 = 25 pu 
III) c0
b = 200¢/pu (low),  β0 = 10¢/pu
2(elastic), S0 = 25 pu 
IV) c0
b = 200¢/pu (low), β0 = 0¢/pu
2(inelastic), S0 = 40 pu 
In Scenario I, in order to draw minimum energy from the 
substation bus and observe energy trade among aggregators, the 
base price c0
b  and demand sensitivity coefficient β0 were 
increased significantly to 800¢/pu and  40¢/pu2. In Scenarios 
II and III, equal base prices but different sensitivity coefficients 
were selected to simulate two normal scenarios. In Scenario IV, 
a base price of 200¢/pu with zero sensitivity coefficient was 
selected so that the price is inelastic to demand to observe 
energy trade and allocation under cheap supply from the 
wholesale market. Furthermore, the transformer capacity was 
increased to 40 pu to draw high amount of energy from the 
wholesale market and observe activation of physical grid 
constraints in DLA.  
All case studies were simulated using MATLAB. Fig. 4 
shows the outcome of the bilevel mechanism for each scenario. 
Here bars show the energy allocation  𝑝𝑘 to each node that has 
aggregator and dotted lines show its corresponding price. The 
energy allocation  𝑝𝑘  to each aggregator 𝑘 (shown in Fig. 3 as 
an A𝑘) and the equilibrium price 𝑐𝑘 are the solutions of DLA 
and ALA at equilibrium when the global SW given by (21) has 
been reached its constrained maximum. Furthermore, the 
market equilibrium price 𝑐𝑘 are different for each aggregator, 
illustrating that DLA is price heterogeneous.  
In Scenario I, due to significantly high wholesale price, the 
aggregators are willing to trade among themselves at different 
Fig. 4.  DLA outcome for aggregators’ share of energy (in pu) and its associated 
price (in ¢/𝑝𝑢) 
Fig. 3.  Modified IEEE 37 node system with aggregators indexed. 𝐴𝑘 is used as 
an abbreviation for aggregator 𝑘. 
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prices ranging from 469 ¢/pu to 592 ¢/pu. Aggregators with 
more buyers, i.e. A3 on node 12 (𝑁𝐵
3 = 25, 𝑁𝑆
3 = 5 ), buy more. 
Several aggregators, especially those with more sellers, sell 
energy. For example, A5 on node 17 supplies a high amount of 
energy as it has more sellers (𝑁𝑆
5 = 22), compared to others. 
The DSO draws only 1.72 pu at c0 of 869 ¢/pu from the 
wholesale market at which it becomes strongly budget 
balanced, i.e. the constraint in (19) is active and the DSO makes 
zero profit. 
In Scenario II, the price c0 decreases to 525 ¢/pu. As a result, 
a smaller number of aggregators sell energy to the DSO. The 
ALA equilibrium prices ck in this scenario range from 387 ¢/pu 
to 524 ¢/pu. The DSO draws 10.83 pu from the wholesale 
market making zero profit. Aggregators import more energy 
compared to Scenario I. For instance, A4 on node 13 that was 
supplying energy as a seller in Scenario I imports energy as a 
buyer in Scenario II. 
In Scenario III, the wholesale market price drops down to 
419 ¢/pu at which point, all aggregators switch to being buyers. 
At this point, the DSO draws 21.87 pu from the wholesale 
market while still not attaining any budget surplus.  
In Scenario IV, the wholesale market price at 200 ¢/pu is 
inelastic and inexpensive. All aggregators import energy at 
different equilibrium prices ranging from 233 ¢/pu to 448 
¢/pu. Aggregators with more buyers and with steeper utilities, 
such as those in nodes 12, 25, and 35, import high amounts. The 
DSO in this Scenario draws 30.14 pu and makes 4992 cents in 
the role of an arbitrager. It is worth emphasizing that the 
proposed mechanism is an SW maximizing bilevel auction in 
which the goal is to maximize the overall SW. The DSO’s 
budget is merely set as a constraint. As pointed earlier, a profit 
seeking DSO can incorporate its surcharge in the pricing model 
in (18).  
Note that the volume of energy traded at each aggregator 
node depends internally on the numbers of buyer and seller 
agents (𝑁𝑆
𝑘 and 𝑁𝐵
𝑘), generation capacities 𝑔𝑗
𝑘, and marginal 
utilities (𝑢′𝑖
𝑘 and 𝑣′𝑗
𝑘) as well as all external factors such as the 
wholesale price 𝑐0 and other aggregators’ market conditions. In 
general, aggregators with a surplus of energy that settle down 
to lower equilibrium prices 𝑐𝑘 tend to supply more 𝑝𝑘 to the rest 
of the network, whereas those that converge to higher 𝑐𝑘 supply 
less. Similarly, aggregators with deficit energy and higher 
equilibrium prices 𝑐𝑘, are assigned more 𝑝𝑘.  
Convergence to the global optimum of the SW (sum of 
utilities of 483 agents) under each scenario is shown in Fig. 5. 
As can be seen, in all cases, DLA converges to within 1% of the 
optimum within as little as 10 iterations. The maximum 
allowable iterations of ALA to converge to equilibrium is 100 
per DLA iteration in all cases, although it was routinely 
observed that equilibrium could be established well before this 
limit.  
In Fig. 5, it can be observed that as the injection  𝟏𝐴
T𝐩 from 
the wholesale market increases, so does the SW. This is because 
the availability of more energy to the buyers results in their 
acquiring less from sellers. Consequently, selling agents 
consume a larger portion of their own generated energy. 
 In Fig. 6, the node voltages 𝑉𝑘 are shown, sorted according 
to the aggregator index 𝑘, separately for each scenario. The 
upper and lower bounds on the pu voltages appear as horizontal 
dotted lines.  In all cases, it can be seen that the voltages remain 
within these bounds, indicating that the voltage constraint in 
(15) is met. Increasingly higher voltage drops can be seen from 
Fig. 6.  Node pu voltages within given bounds. 
Fig. 7.  Real, reactive, and apparent power flows in line 𝑘 (line entering node 
𝑘) within line MVA limits. 
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Scenarios I through IV. This is a direct outcome of increasing 
supply from the wholesale market. 
 Line power flows are shown in Fig. 7. The dotted lines 
pertain to the line MVA limits (𝑆?̅?). Adjacent vertical bars 
correspond to real (𝑃𝑘), reactive (𝑄𝑘), and apparent (𝑆𝑘) power 
flows of each line segment, which are again ordered according 
to the indices of their corresponding nodes. Higher energy 
supplied from the wholesale market results in more power flows 
(top – bottom). Moreover, in Scenario I (top), the power flows 
in several lines are in the reverse direction, as it appear below 
the x-axis. Conversely, in Scenario IV (bottom), all lines that 
have downstream aggregators can be seen to be delivering 
power to them. Additionally, the powers flowing through three 
lines (indexed 2, 8, 27) are at their limits (13). The adjacent set 
of lines labeled 12, 13 and 17 as per their node indices (see Fig. 
3) which provide power directly to aggregators A3, A4, and A5 
are taken up as examples to further highlight some 
observations. 
In Scenario I, due to significantly high wholesale price 𝑐0, 
with high number of sellers and low price, A4 and A5 on nodes 
13 and 17 supply to A3 on node 12 that has 25 buyers and only 
5 sellers (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 7). In Scenario II, however, as 𝑐0 
is decreased, A4 on node 13 starts to import (see Fig. 4) while 
A5 keeps exporting to feed A3 as well as A4. This forces power 
flow in lines indexed 17 and 13 to become negative regardless 
of the fact that A4 imports. Notice also that A3 imports from 
other upstream aggregators in addition to A5 resulting to a 
positive power flow in line 12. In Scenarios III and IV, due to 
further decrease in the wholesale price 𝑐0, all aggregators 
import power which result to positive power flow in all lines. 
So far, we discussed results pertaining to DLA, distribution 
grid constraints, and power flows. In order to illustrate the 
results of ALAs, auction outcome for A6 (𝑁𝐵
6 = 8, 𝑁𝑆
6 = 10 ) 
under Scenarios I and IV are summarized in Table II. In 
Scenario I, A6 exports 0.834 pu to the grid which is obtained as 
the sum of supplies (∑ 𝑠𝑗
6
𝑗 ) of its sellers minus sum of demands 
of its buyers (∑ 𝑑𝑖
6
𝑖 ). The price 𝑐6 stabilizes at 533 ¢/pu at 
which only those buyers and sellers’ whose marginal utilities 
𝑢𝑖
′6 and 𝑣𝑗
′6 becomes equal to this price can trade. Furthermore, 
because of high wholesale price 𝑐0, all sellers are willing to 
trade and declare nonzero 𝑠𝑗
6. For example, seller 1 generates 
𝑔1
6 = 0.434 pu and sells 𝑠1
6 = 0.325 pu at  𝑣𝑗
′6 = 𝑐0 = 553. 
In Scenario IV, A6 imports 0.958 pu at a lower equilibrium 
price of 273 ¢/pu. Buyers’ demand increase and only sellers 
with marginal utilities 𝑣𝑗
′6 equal to 𝑐6 trade nonzero supply 𝑠𝑗
6. 
Notice that sellers 3, 6, 7, and 8 whose marginal utilities are 
higher than 𝑐6, i.e. 𝑣𝑗
′6 > 𝑐6, are assigned zeros supply 𝑠𝑗
6, 
allowing them to consume all their generation 𝑔𝑗
6 instead of 
selling so that their utilities are maximized. Notice that the 
marginal utilities of all agents (both buyers and sellers) that are 
trading becomes uniform and equal to the market equilibrium 
price 𝑐6 for both scenarios. 
 
TABLE II 
ALA OUTCOME FOR AGGREGATOR 6 (A6) UNDER SCENARIOS I 
AND IV 
Aggregator 6 on node 18 (𝒩𝐵
6 = 5, 𝒩𝑆
6 = 20) 
𝑝6 (pu) 𝑐6 (¢/pu) 𝑉6 (pu) 
I IV I IV I IV 
-0.834 0.958 553 273 1.032 0.972 
Buyer Agents 
𝑑𝑖
6(pu) 𝑐𝑖
6 (¢/pu) 𝑢𝑖
′6(¢/pu) 
I IV I IV I IV 
0.115 0.234 553 273 553 273 
0.105 0.214 553 273 553 273 
0.118 0.240 553 273 553 273 
0.079 0.160 553 273 553 273 
0.131 0.267 553 273 553 273 
0.126 0.257 553 273 553 273 
0.081 0.165 553 273 553 273 
0.123 0.251 553 273 553 273 
Seller Agents 
𝑔𝑗
6(pu) 𝑠𝑗
6(pu) 𝑣𝑗
′6(¢/pu) 
I IV I IV I IV 
0.434 0.434 0.325 0.211 553 273 
0.437 0.437 0.351 0.262 553 273 
0.110 0.110 0.017 0 553 467 
0.232 0.232 0.151 0.067 553 273 
0.270 0.270 0.141 0.007 553 273 
0.153 0.153 0.018 0 553 490 
0.249 0.249 0.127 0 553 272 
0.185 0.185 0.086 0 553 295 
0.274 0.274 0.182 0.087 553 273 
0.432 0.432 0.315 0.194 553 273 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A globally efficient energy allocation mechanism that does 
not violate any grid constraints has been proposed here. At the 
DSO level, the auction is price heterogeneous among 
aggregators, while the lower level auction is price uniform 
among home agents. Instead of determining the energy price as 
in other recently proposed mechanisms [8]-[10] the upper level 
agent (DSO) allocates power to the aggregators, that in turn 
conduct their separate ALA to establish market equilibrium 
conditions locally within their agents.  
One of the advantages of this new approach is that the 
aggregators can conduct their own auctions in islanded 
conditions. During islanding, the aggregator would assume zero 
power allocated from the DSO. Its ALA would converge to an 
appropriate unit price entirely via market equilibrium, allowing 
locally energy trade among its agents to proceed. 
The proposed mechanism is able to maximize SW requiring 
access to neither the agents’ utility functions nor their power 
generations. ALA is able to do so by inferring the derivatives 
Fig. 5.  Optimum SW under each scenario. In scenarios other than III, 
some aggregator 𝑘 returns 𝒶𝑘 = 𝐹 and DLA terminates. 
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of the agents’ utility functions from bidding information (see 
Proposition 5). This is another advantage of the proposed 
bilevel mechanism. 
As ALA relies on market equilibrium prices, it is an iterative 
mechanism, requiring several iterations to establish 
equilibrium. As a tradeoff, DLA requires relatively few 
iterations to converge to the SW maximizing power allocation. 
This is because it uses primal problem decomposition instead 
of the dual decomposition approach. An algorithm to maximize 
SW that would use dual decomposition, would need gradient 
information, whereas unlike in primal decomposition, the 
derivatives of the agents’ utilities with respect to allocated 
energy would not be readily available to the DSO.  The 
alternative is for a dual decomposition optimization scheme to 
apply subgradient descent, which is known to converge very 
slowly (see [28] for details).  
There are certain limitations of the research described below 
that can be addressed effectively in future research. The 
simplified DistFlow equations used here neglect power loss. 
The underlying physical grid model can be extended to consider 
line losses by using a more elaborate set of power flow 
equations [2]. 
The bilevel auction assumes a radial distribution system. This 
is because radial networks are very common, and prevalent 
within the United States. In order to adapt the proposed bilevel 
auction mechanism to other networks, only the manner in which 
the physical grid constraints are imposed (using DistFlow 
equations) would need to be replaced appropriately.  
The present approach assumes a balanced network. The 
mechanism could be extended for use in 3-phase unbalanced 
networks by implementing additional grid constraints 
specifying the maximum allowable power imbalance, along 
with some algorithmic modifications.  
Future research can also investigate how to extend the current 
model to multiple time slots. Aggregators that do not include 
any energy storage or conventional generators can implement 
an auction during each time slot independently of the others. 
For aggregators that do so, temporal constraints would need to 
be taken into account. 
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